My name is Isabelle Madorsky. I’m an editor, researcher, and writer based in Chicago, IL. I have worked in academia, in publishing, in college and graduate applications, in marketing and education, and in informal artistic environments. I believe that every kind of person and every kind of work needs research, writing, and editing in some capacity in order to function. I’m happy to help out in whatever way I can.
Inquires for editing, research, or writing services please email me @isabellemmadorsky
These days what that looks like is being a part time freelance editor, writer, and researcher, and a part time barista. So in practice, thats a decent amount of red ink and whole lot of iced lattes.
After graduating with a degree in Philosophy and Gender Women, and Sexuality Studies, I spent a year and some change traveling, writing, editing, and barista-ing. Aimless wandering across a variety of countries, blowing through my entire savings account, making zines on poorly folded library printer paper, and then making a couple thousand cups of coffee, have eventually lead me here. Here is essentially the conclusion that the unifying theme of passion in my life, academically, personally, and professionally, has been working in and around narrative, media, and writing. This has inspired me to work to go back to school and get another unemployable degree (philosophy and gender and women’s studies were apparently not enough). Until then, I hope to keep working around narrative, media, and writing in whatever form that can take. I have never been more excited!
Editing
I began freelance editing services in college, editing college application essays for Chicago High School students, the occasional term paper, and eventually peer graduate school application essays. I worked as an editing intern for Future House Publishing in 2023, editing fantasy and sci-fi novels. In the past two years, again as a freelancer, I have edited a college level introductory Environmental Engineering textbook and two realistic fiction short stories
Research
Writing
My experience in original research began in 2019 with a project examining the impact of exposure to online conspiracy theories on high school students. In 2021, I conducted an independent research project on feminist gender identity construction in the second and third waves. Additionally, I worked as a research assistant with Michael Grunwald, a nationally syndicated columnist and New York Times best-selling author, focusing on environmental public policy and cultural discussions. Simultaneously, I worked as a writer for the Amish Heritage Foundation, where I researched topics relating to Amish history and culture, US education politics, and American religious laws.
During the summer of 2022, I collaborated with Professor Asimina Nikolopoulou at Grinnell College on her project about Affect Theory, Contemporary Epistemologies, and Mixed Media Testimonies. My particular research focused on Affect Theory, Hauntology, and Jewish mysticism.
I have experience with both academic and professional writing styles. In 2022 I was engaged in writing a research paper while working as a research assistant for Asimina Nikolopoulou. In 2021 I wrote for the Amish Heritage Foundation blog on issues relating to Amish culture and American history and politics. I also have a great deal of experience writing academic papers on topics falling into the categories of philosophy, social, cultural and political analysis, and media analysis. If you keep scrolling you can see some examples of my essays. Please enjoy!
Media Analysis
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In the Disney Channel Original movie Avalon High directed by Stuart Gillard, the main character, Allie Pennington, infringes upon the boundaries drawn with the realms of gender, space, and time. This occurs textually, with Allie being depicted as a 21st century American teenage girl who is also living as the reincarnated soul of King Arthur Pendragon, legendary ruler of medieval Britain. This kind of boundary violation is accentuated in my reading, which imagines a subtextual understanding of how Allie’s dual personhood can function as an exploration of trans identity, and how transness can utilize an atypical and non-stationary relationship to reality and identity to generate its own existence.
Avalon High opens with a cluster of flashing scenes of two groups of medieval knights, one light and one dark, riding into battle on a beach. The shot focuses on the group of light knights, and then focuses further still on their leader, a girl with streaming blonde hair, who we see knocked violently off her horse to the ground. Then, Allie wakes up.
Allie Pennington is the daughter of two medieval literature professors who have recently decided to end their nomadic wandering between prestigious universities in order to settle down in Annapolis, Maryland, where Allie will spend the next three years finishing high school. Allie passes off her strange and vivid dream as a result of her parents’ profession and proceeds downstairs to speak with her parents and help unpack their new home. The proceeding scene clues the audience into the fact that Allie has never been able to feel like she fit in anywhere due to the family's constant moving around. She is the outcast, the “new girl,” and she mourns the loss of normalcy that a typical teenage girl might have experienced in a different life.
Allie has immediately characterized herself as a queer body in this scene, an atypical teenage girl, and specifically, a girl whose behaviors and environment prevent her from accessing the normalcy that she highlights as critical to girlhood. When discussing her dream with her parents she remarks that she dreams about King Arthur, “not like most girls who dream about knights in shining armor, mine have dirt all over them and BO, and are missing half their teeth '' (2:46). Her dialogue in this scene and its emphasis on contrasting her life, and specifically her gendered experience, learning about Arthurian legends to that of a “typical teenage girl” creates an allegorical comparison between what is normal, and her connection to the medieval. Her gender queerness is therefore immediately tied to her connection to the Arthurian legends; it is what removes her from normal girlhood and it is a symbol of her otherness.
As the plot progresses Allie becomes embroiled in the social scene at Avalon High, her local high school, and she meets the captain of the football team, Will. Allie is first introduced to Will when they both stop for a drink at a water fountain while out running. She is then confronted with a sudden vision of she and Will dressed in armor drinking from goblets filled from a waterfall (5:13). Throughout the movie, Allie continues to experience these visions, slipping between realities and seeing the world through both the modern high school lens and the ancient Arthurian lens. These visions seamlessly integrate themselves into Allie's perception of reality as both a means of expressing how she relates to and perceives others, as well as a representation of what we later learn are the past lives of Allie and her peers. These glimpses also tend to fixate on Will, who becomes Allie’s eventual love interest.
If we apply the allegorical lens of the Arthurian reality being symbolic of Allie’s gender queerness, then her fixation on Will, who she believes to be a reincarnated King Arthur for most of the movie, is both an expression of her romantic affection, and also a form of subconscious self-recognition. The qualities Allie is attracted to in Will, his strength as a leader, his kindness, his protectiveness, are also all qualities that lead her to the conclusion that he is King Arthur reincarnated. In other words, the traits that Allie is drawn to, that she admires, describe the ideal of manhood and masculinity in King Arthur's time, particularly Arthur himself. Given what we eventually learn, that it is Allie and not Will that is King Arthur reincarnated, we can reexamine Allie’s attraction to and construction of Will in a different light, reading it instead as a classic queer/trans dynamic, wanting to both be someone, and wanting to fuck them (or, because this is disney, kiss them very chastely after they win the big football game). Furthermore, because Allie’s attraction is clearly based on her admiration for Will’s qualities, qualities that she believes make him King Arthur, that admiration can also be read as an expression of self love, given that Allie herself is King Arthur. Allie’s movements between realities then become not just an exploration of identity, but also a celebration and expression of love for it.
Allie’s full awareness of her dual identity comes later on in the film as a result of her desire to protect Will. In the final confrontation with Mordred, who also believes that Will is King Arthur, Allie jumps in front of a prone Will, between him and Mordred, brandishing a plastic sword. As Mordred laughs, Allie's sword begins to transform from plastic into steel. Miles, Allies' only close friend, the mythological sorcerer Merlin reincarnated, and more importantly to this queer reading of Allie, gay (but in the Shakespearan way where he's gay the whole time and then in the last 2 minutes he's paired up with a suitable woman), murmurs, “any sword in the hands of Arthur becomes Excalibur. It was you all along, Allie, you're King Arthur!” (1:18:20). With the sword fully transformed, the full case of characters is transported fully into Allie’s medieval reality, complete with the beach and glowing armor from her dream. She sits on her horse and declares “I am, I am King Arthur” (1:18:35) with a look of joy and understanding on her face.
Again applying the lens of gender queerness to this scene, Allie’s identity being revealed in this manner can be interpreted as Allie embracing the merging of her realities by acting in ways that violate the gendered and temporal scripts. Throughout the movie, we see multiple scenes of Will acting out his masculinity by physically defending weaker students against antagonists. In this scene however, Will takes on the role of the damsel in distress, Mordred mocks him, calling him “weak and in need of defending”, seemingly already picking up on how they have begun to transgress against the gendered script. And while Will’s acts of heroism involved standing up to bullies by the lockers, Allie’s protective nature is instinctually Arthurian, she brings a sword to a 21st century fight. It is a kind of unconscious and inevitable self acceptance, an indication that Allie is not limited to the gender or temporal context she appears to occupy in any particular moment. She exists as both King Arthur and Allie Pennington always simultaneously and without concern for the ways in which this cannot be possible.
Once Allie and the rest of her peers enter into the more recognizably Arthurian reality, Allie is the only Arthurian character whose reincarnated gender is different from that of their previous life. Mordred remarks that he was unable to even consider her as a potential Arthur (embarrassing considering her name is literally Allie Pennington) because “King Arthur can’t be a girl” to which Allie responds “and yet here we are” (1:20:02). It is crucial to recognize that the intended messaging in this scene was reflective of an era of cis girlpower in Disney movies. Allie being the reincarnation of King Arthur was meant to articulate a liberal idea of feminism that attempts to deconstruct stereotypes and argues that cis women can perform stereotypically masculine behaviors just as well as cis men. However, in this case, the film unintentionally argues that not only can women perform traditionally masculine behaviors, they can also be men. This invites a reading of Allie that is reflective not of the cis feminist perspective, but instead of a gender deconstructive perspective wherein Allie exists as both a man and a woman who embodies characteristics of both and feels no need to justify either her identity as a woman or as King Arthur. Allie doesn’t respond to Mordred's taunting about her womanhood with an exclamation about women's rights or feminism, but rather embraces and confirms the reality of their situation as one that exists outside of time, space, and gender. Allie is a girl, a King, a 21st century teenager, and a reincarnated thousand year old man. She lives in both worlds simultaneously and paradoxically, but ultimately she saves her friends, wears cool medieval armor, and kisses a conventionally attractive popular boy at the end of the movie so she isn’t too worried about the details.
Allie’s personhood is defined based on multiple contradicting and transgressive dualities that characterize her as an outsider. This sense of “wrongness”, or lack of coherence to larger society does contribute to how we read Allie as trans. However, by the end of the movie, Allie is also able to find a community that shares a connection to the Arthurian reality, the reality symbolic of what made her feel wrong or othered in the first place. The nature of her existence allowed her to not only participate in this community, but also to protect it when it was threatened. In true fairytale fashion, Allie is able to achieve a happy ending, and it is one that she could not have participated in without her own dual identities, her refusal to conform to a linear gender expression, time period, or place. So, what Disney executives imagined as a declawed liberal feminist girl power ideological push, becomes an encouragement to become a genderless (or genderfull depending on how you want to read it), reincarnating, quasi-immortal. Much more interesting that way.
Works Cited
Avalon High. Directed by Stuart Gillard, 2016. Disney ABC Domestic Television, 2010.
Keegan, Cael M. “Revisitation: a Trans Phenomenology of the Media Image.” MedieKultur 32.61 (2016): n. pag. Web.
“Mutilating Gender.” The Transgender Studies Reader. Routledge, 2006. 331–348. Web.
The Ballad of Genesis and Lady Jaye. Directed by Marie Losier, 2011.
“THEE PSYCHICK BIBLE: Thee Apocryphal Scriptures ov Genesis Breyer P-Orridge and Thee Third Mind ov Thee Temple ov Psychick Youth.” Feral House. Inc. 2010.
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In Rachel Pollack’s Doom Patrol, comic no 74, the reader follows two parallel plotlines that center around the creation and sale of Robotman merchandise, specifically, robotic replicas of Robotman’s body and consciousness. For those unfamiliar with Robotman, AKA Cliff Steele, as a character, I highly recommend reading or watching some Doom Patrol media. I find that many iterations often manage to combine a kind of self aware humor, philosophical exploration, and genuine love and appreciation for human stories, that make it enjoyable even to those typically resistant to the superhero genre. In the meantime, for comprehension purposes, I will give a very brief summary of the necessary components of the backstory. Though the details vary slightly between iterations, the most pertinent information to understand is that when Cliff Steele, a daredevil/racecar driver, is hit by a car, his body is destroyed and his mind is salvaged and placed into a robotic body. Though his new body is capable of extraordinary feats of strength, speed, and endurance, as a result of his new form, Steele is regularly forced to contend with the consequences of being a human mind trapped inside a body that does not feel, grow, or decay. Comic no. 74 examines these struggles through a unique lens informed by the author’s own experiences with identity and the social and physical conditions of personhood.
In the first of the two plotlines in comic no. 74, the audience follows Steele and Kate (AKA Coagula, another superhero) as they track down the creators of the merchandise, and eventually destroy them. This process allows Steele the opportunity to explore and reaffirm his humanity. The second parallel plot line follows one of Steele’s copied robot counterparts as he has his experience of reality manipulated by a group of children. This version of Steele eventually becomes aware of the truth of his existence, that he is a copy and his reality can be altered by remote control, and must contend with the implications this has for his identity and interpretation of his existence.
Issue no.74 of Doom Patrol, like many that center on Robotman, deals very heavily with themes of identity, dehumanization, and truth, by forcing the characters and audience to ask questions about who and what Cliff Steel is or is not. In this paper, I analyze the articulation of these themes while also offering a potential criticism of their ultimate resolutions. I will argue that, while this issue does a fantastic job of articulating the meaning and power of self identification, as well as exploring how such a thing is done within the context of extreme external dehumanization, it ultimately fails to unpack the underlying assumption that human-ness, which in superhero media is often allegorically representative of many forms of social normativity, is a prerequisite for being deserving of basic recognition and respect.
Towards the middle of the first plotline, Steele and Kate confront the man behind the sale of the Robotman merchandise. The man, who is never given a name and is exclusively referred to as “the man”, possibly in reference to the American slang term for authority figures as a means of invoking the notion of a social authority, refuses to stop his production and sale of robot copies. In response to Steele’s anger regarding the issue, the man antagonistically asks Steele to prove that he is the real Cliff Steel and that the copies are not. This comment prompts Cliff to doubt his value, he begins to question what makes him “better than any of those things lying on those tables” (21). This line of dialogue is a clear indication that Steele’s belief in his own worth and personhood is contingent not on who he thinks he is, but on who he is not. In other words, it reveals how he defines himself in relation to others, who and what they are, how they are seen and valued, and how they may see him, determines who he is and how he understands himself. In response to Steele’s doubts, Kate argues that he can constitute his own identity, the same as any other person can, by disregarding other people's views and determining for himself that he is a “human being”. This conversation decenters Steele’s desire to constitute himself in relation to the copies, which metaphorically represent those who seek to dehumanize him, and recenters it around Steele himself. It articulates the idea that the “truth” of someone’s identity is not limited to what they have been labeled as by others, but can also be defined by what they have determined that they are themselves.
The second plot line follows an entirely robotic Cliff Steele, who has been programmed with the original Steele’s memories and experiences. A group of children, who Steele believes, as a result of his programming, to be his superhero friends and colleagues, purchase his software and use a remote control to torment him and manipulate what he sees and thinks. One of the children, Alice, who Steele believes is his friend Jane, feels bad for taking advantage of Steele, and reveals the truth, which prompts Steele to take the remote control for himself. The revelation that he is not who he thought he was, that he is merely a copy of a “real” thing, and that his experience of reality is completely flexible and untethered, leads Steele to choosing to use the remote to torment himself out of a combination of anger, grief, and nihilism . He turns the dial completely in one direction exposing himself to a completely disjointed reality where he experiences “[e]verything. All at once” (22). He is terrified by the experience, and in the end, though he knows now that he has never really met her and that she is not there, he calls out to his friend Jane for help. This is the last the audience sees of this version of Steele. Although we are not given a satisfying or cathartic resolution to his narrative in the way we are with the original Steele’s plotline, robot Steele’s experiences are critical to the audience’s understanding of the character and of how personhood is being imagined in this story. Though we know that this version is a copy, that he in some senses could be considered not “real”, we also observe his personhood, his unique and complex self. Robot Steele has self awareness and consciousness that changes in reaction to his environment, he learns and adapts, he makes independent choices. And he feels. Robot Steele feels grief and love for people that he remembers knowing, he feels fear at his circumstances, he misses his friends. Despite the rejection of personhood robot Steele himself provides, the audience cannot deny the haunting certainty that Pollack sets forth, that he feels real, that his subjective experience disproves the logical conclusion of his unreality.
In the final scene of the issue, Steele and Kate destroy the robotman copies and the warehouse they are made in, and return to confront the man. The man, enraged by the destruction of his so-called “private property”, yells at Steele and tells him that he is no better than “those broken pieces of junk over there”. Steele replies by saying that he is different, because they’re machines and he is not, therefore implying that he is better because he is not a machine. In my view, this ending entirely misses the point of the rest of the comic and of Steele’s character in general. This ending brings Steele’s identity back to being constituted in relation to others instead of in relation to himself like Kate articulated. Instead of combating the fundamental statement that the man made, that being machine/robotic/non-normative means being worthless, this scene simply articulates that Steele isn’t the thing that the man has deemed worthless in the first place.
From the second plotline, it is clear that Steele’s copies aren’t empty robotic husks with no independent thought or personhood, but rather fully fledged consciousnesses that are capable of heart-wrenching emotional and cognitive experiences. Therefore, Cliff, even as a human, is in no way better or really even that different than the fully mechanical copies. They all struggle and feel and exist and they are all victims of the same brand of dehumanization and otherization. In fact, the despair that the robot Steele experienced upon discovering the nature of his existence very closely mirrors Steele’s own struggle with his transformed robotic nature. Neither is able to feel like a “real” person because their mode of existence is complicated, and is outside of the norm for what personhood traditionally looks like. To fully combat the man, and the dehumanizing and exploitative social forces that he comes to represent, Steele should have instead disregarded the man’s perspective entirely, and rejected otherization regardless of who it is targeted at. The man should have been wrong not because he had mistaken Steele for a machine when Steele was really a human, but rather because the idea that some people are worthless because they are different is wrong. That is the real message of Steele’s character, that regardless of what others think “proves” you are a person, the only thing that matters is that you decide that you are.
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I: Introduction
In 1975, American novelist Ira Levin’s 1972 bestselling novel, “The Stepford Wives” was adapted by director Bryan Forbes into a satirical thriller film of the same name. The Stepford Wives film, like Levin’s novel, followed Joanna, her husband Walter, and their two children as they moved from New York City to a Connecticut Suburb called Stepford. Joanna and her neighbor Bobbi quickly become skeptical of the outdated gendered attitudes in Stepford and attempt to investigate the local Men's Association as well as the strange housewives of the town. As the film progresses, Joanna and Bobbi begin to suspect the Men's Association of doing something to the women, but before Joanna or Bobbi can convince their husbands to leave, Joanna finds that Bobbi has been completely transformed into another perfect Stepford housewife. The movie culminates with Joanna discovering that the Men's Association is replacing their wives with robotic look-alikes and Joanna is killed by her own robotic double.
Despite The Stepford Wives commercial success, the critical response was very divided. Many feminists of the era, including feminist scholar and activist Betty Friedan, were not in favor of the film; Friedan herself is quoted as calling it a “rip-off of the women's movement”. However, other feminists and critics of the time appreciated the film for its accurate depictions of patriarchal attitudes and dogma. In spite of the mixed responses, the debut of the first film was followed throughout the 80s and 90s by three additional Stepford films released as made-for-television movies. These films took place in the same universe as the original but received very little of the previous film’s acclaim or success. Then, in 2004, a new Stepford Wives remake was released, directed by Frank Oz and starring a variety of famous actors such as Nicole Kidman, Bette Midler, and Glenn Close. Despite the star studded cast, this remake also received very poor reviews, and ended up costing more money to make than it brought in in international sales.
In the most recent Stepford Wives remake, the audience still follows Joanna, Walter, and children, on their move from NYC to Stepford, but this time, the move is motivated by high powered TV executive Joanna’s loss of job followed by a dramatic nervous breakdown. Once they arrive, Joanna still works to uncover the secrets of Stepford, but in this iteration she and Bobbi are also joined by a gay man named Roger. Bobbi and Roger are both transformed into their partners' perfect ideals through the use of microchips implanted in their brain and Joanna is seemingly transformed as well. After that, this remake takes a much sharper turn from the source material and has Joanna and Walter work together to destroy the microchip technology and free the women of Stepford together.
In the following paper, I examine these two renditions of The Stepford Wives, the 1975 and 2004 films, using a comparative content analysis. I begin by examining two foundational feminist sources, The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan and Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead by Sheryl Sandberg, one source from each era/wave of feminism corresponding to the release of each film. I then analyze The Stepford Wives films themselves. Ultimately I argue that The Stepford Wives films are highly emblematic of the popular white feminisms of their respective eras. Further, I emphasize that despite the many differences between the feminist texts and films, the popular white feminisms’ expressed within them are unified by a shared emphasis on white women's victimization and a highly exclusionary understanding of women's liberation .
II: Definitions
To begin, I must define two of the more nebulous terms through which I will be articulating the central concepts of my argument throughout this paper. Particularly, I want to discuss what I mean by “popular feminism” as I have referred to it in the introduction section above and will continue to utilize it throughout the paper. I draw my definition of popular feminism from Sarah Banet-Weiser’s 2018 book, Empowered: Popular Feminism and Popular Misogyny, in which Banet-Weiser discusses the relationship between popular feminism and popular misogyny in the modern day. Banet-Weiser defines popular feminism in her book by three components: its accessibility - its circulation in popular and commercial media, its popularity - its ability to be liked and admired by like minded groups and individuals, and its profitability - its ability to be sold.
The other term I will define here, “white feminism”, is predictably very heavily linked to the previous term I defined. Banet-Weiser points out that white feminism is almost always those feminisms that are most visible, and therefore, most popular. Therefore, while white feminism and Popular feminism are not synonyms, interactions between capitalism and white supremacy often make it so that they are extremely likely to overlap. White feminism is defined by Mia McKenzie in Banet-Weiser’s book, as “a description of the way that ‘white women put their own needs and well-being above black women everyday and call it feminism’” (32). Building off of that definition, I understand it in the context of this paper as any feminism that conceptualizes women and women’s issues as a single universal category by only discussing or addressing problems that impact upper class white women.
III: Methodology
My method for this research paper is a form of qualitative content analysis that I developed based on the standard format of coding that combines both deductive and inductive frameworks. I began the process by reading through the two secondary sources, The Feminine Mystique and Lean In, and then writing a very brief summary about how I interpreted the overall intentions of the author. After my initial reading, I went back and started to pick out meaning units, sections of the texts that I found to be particularly impactful, highly relevant to the ideology of the author, or clarifying of those general themes/intentions I recognized in my summary. I then abstracted those units into a series of codes. After a few readings and having gathered a variety of codes, I condensed my codes further into six categories, three from each source. These categories are: identity, idealized femininity, and addiction and illness, and professional ambition, internal barriers to success, and individualism. Once these categories were gathered, I moved into my analysis of The Stepford Wives films.
I began this process by watching each of the films once, and like with the secondary sources, constructing a brief summary of what I interpreted to be the creators’ intentions with each production. Next I went through and noted any key differences between the films, reasoning that because they were an original and remake of the same movie, that any differences would likely correspond to changes in ideology between eras. I then applied the categories from the secondary sources to my analysis and laid out specific examples of how the differences and similarities in each film related back to their corresponding secondary source and therefore the era of popular white feminism represented.
IV: Literature Review: Foundational Popular White Feminist Texts
The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan
The Feminine Mystique by Betty Friedan was published in 1963 and is held by many feminist historians to be partially responsible for sparking the beginnings of the second wave feminist movement. In 1964, the year after its publication, The Feminine Mystique had become a best seller and had distinguished itself from the work of Friedan’s white academic feminist contemporaries by selling over a million copies in less than two years. This quality of The Feminine Mystique’s reception and subsequent cultural impact make it a perfect example of a foundational popular white feminist text for that era. In this section, I will discuss my categorization of the ideologies present in the first chapter of The Feminine Mystique titled “The Problem That Has No Name” with a focus on articulating those ideologies that are most representative of the temporal context of second wave white feminism.
The first and largest category that I was able to construct from my reading of “The Problem That Has No Name” was made up of codes relating to the concept of identity. Friedan had gathered a variety of interview responses from American women that discuss similar experiences with dependence on others, feelings of purposelessness, and a lack of any meaningful passion or self knowledge. Friedan quotes one woman who says, “the problem is always being the children’s mommy, or the minister’s wife and never being myself” (28). This quote implies that because the housewife’s labor is defined by enabling the rest of the family’s functioning, she lacks the capacity to establish an identity independent of that role. In other words, because she can’t clock out at the office or finish with school for the day like her husband and children, she is never not a housewife and is therefore never a person in her own right.
The next category I identified deals with the concept of idealized post war femininity which Friedan defines specifically by the figure of the archetypal housewife. She says that “[e]xperts told them [women] how to catch a man and keep him, how to breastfeed children and handle their toilet training…how to buy a dishwasher, bake bread…how to dress, look, and act more feminine and make marriage more exciting...” (3) Friedan attributes the heightened rates of women seeking to get married, have families, and work as housewives, to the prevalence of this ideal being circulated by doctors, politicians, news agencies etc. The notion being that a critical component of the country's recovery from the devastation of the second world war was a reclamation of traditional femininity, an ideal untainted by the masculinizing responsibilities and freedoms women experienced during the war time years while men were abroad. Women were told that in order to achieve personal happiness, satisfaction, purpose, etc, they could now rely on their rightful way of life that had been taken from them during the war. Friedan however argues that this ideal, like all ideals, was ultimately unattainable because women who achieved the technical requirements of this standard were never emotionally or spiritually satisfied by it, and ultimately neither were the men or the society that pressured them into those behaviors and roles.
The failure to meet this ideal, or rather the failure to achieve satisfaction through committing oneself to the ideal, is what brings Friedan to her discussion of addiction and illness which is the final category that I identified. Friedan notes numerous times that while psychoanalysts, social scientists, philosophers, etc all claimed that women would be happy if they embraced their traditional and natural roles (11), no matter how high birth rates and marriage rates soared, the problem persisted. In response to the so-called “crisis of the housewife”, men, society, and even the affected women themselves tried desperately to fill their emptiness. This resulted in widespread addiction amongst housewives, anything from pills (31), to alcohol, shopping, sex (29), etc. Furthermore, the rate of women in psychotherapy sky-rocketed (13), with doctors trying their best to diagnose and prescribe the unhappiness and then madness of women with outwardly “perfect lives”. All of these components of the crisis just serve as further evidence of Friedan’s position, that the existence of the ideal itself, as well as the patriarchal standards and restrictions that uphold and enforce it, are the true cause.
What Friedan does not articulate in this chapter, is how the difficulties she discusses, particularly in relation to societal standards of womanhood and the powers exerted over them by men, are experienced by figures other than the stereotypical housewife. She fails to ask what happens to women who do not share the housewife’s proximity to the ideal. Multiply marginalized women, meaning women who experience oppression on axes beyond their womanhood, for example, experience such a large distance from the standards Friedan articulates that their oppression comes not from the dissatisfaction of achieving an ideal and still suffering, but rather from the direct physical consequences of being societally othered for their failure. Friedan’s lack of discussion surrounding the ways in which non-white non-middle class housewives relate to the concepts she is discussing reveals a flaw in Fridan’s overall arguments. While critically relevant to the effects of patriarchy on the most privileged women in society, Friedan’s arguments ultimately set middle class white women as the norm of womanhood and as a result,
miss the multitudinous experiences of other women, and what incredibly important aspects of the structure and function of the patriarchy their experiences provide insight into.
Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead by Sheryl Sanberg
Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead by Sheryl Sanberg was published in 2013, and was listed as a New York Times bestseller for more than a year following its initial publication. In the first two
Years afterwards, Lean In sold 2.25 million copies worldwide and blew up into a cultural sensation with additional books published, a website launched, and lean in circles organized for professional women. Lean In also generated a lot of controversy from critical readers, journalists, academics, and facebook commenters. Some identified Lean In as a work of faux-feminist neoliberal propaganda that repacked bootstraps narratives into an updated sleek “feminist” box. In bell hooks’ article “Dig Deep: Beyond Lean In”, she contextualizes the impact of Lean In by explaining that “[today][w]e were far more likely to hear that we are living in a post-feminist society than to hear voices clamoring to learn more about feminism. This seems to have changed with Sanberg’s book Lean In, holding steady on Times bestseller list for more than sixteen weeks.” This phenomenon that bell hooks points to, is what characterized Lean In as a foundational popular white feminist text of the third wave. Unlike many other feminist texts, Lean In occupies a well known, commonly accepted, and heavily monetized position in popular culture, and it is the best available equivalent to The Feminine Mystique among third wave texts. In this section, like with the Feminine Mystique, I will examine the first chapter of Lean In titled “The Leadership Ambition Gap: What Would You Do If You Weren’t Afraid?” and use it to characterize the popular white feminisms of the third wave.
The predominant category I constructed from this chapter was, predictably, professional ambition. Sanberg discusses defining qualities and consequences of ambition in the workplace, the difficulties she and others have experienced as ambitious women, and the lack of ambition present among many women at higher levels of professional power. Sanberg particularly focuses on the leadership ambition gap which refers to a phenomenon observed by Sanberg of qualified, intelligent, even ambitious women in corporate work environments peeling off just before they reach high level positions. Sanberg notes that despite an increase in things like women's level of education (7) and self proclaimed level of career ambition (13), women are still not pursuing the highest levels of power in business that previous generations of feminists thought that they would if given the tools to do so. The other subcategories that I found through my analysis of this chapter all relate to Sanberg’s subsequent attempts to understand and conceptualize how this gap in achievement occurs and what can be done to address it.
The next category I isolated was women's internal barriers to success. Though Sanberg briefly acknowledges the impact of “external barriers erected by society” (8) on women's achievement, her focus in this chapter is heavily placed on internal barriers. Sanberg believes that factors like a lack of self confidence, unequal personal partnerships, and unattainable standards, can be major contributors in blocking women's paths to advancement (9). Sanberg argues that when women internalize the messaging of patriarchy they are more likely to be pressured into behavior that is stereotypically feminine, even in professional contexts. As a result, they refuse to be aggressive, powerful, demanding, etc, all qualities that Sanberg points to as critical for professional success. Sanberg says, “[w]e [women] hold ourselves back in ways both big and small, by lacking self-confidence, by not raising our hands, and by pulling back when we should be leaning in.” (8) “Leaning in” as Sanberg puts it, is a call for women to “reignite the revolution by internalizing the revolution” (10). She wants women to work to combat the influences of patriarchy in their own lives and prioritize their personal advancement as a mechanism by which to combat systemic inequality. She phrases it as “[t]he shift to a more equal world will happen person by person” (10). In this case, the underlying meaning is that the world becomes more equal one white woman CEO at a time.
The ideology underpinning Sanberg’s insistence that women combat their internal issues as opposed to focusing on external forces is indicative of the final category I established: individualism. Sanberg continuously argues in this chapter that revolutionary feminist action will be enacted when women (rich white women) can add their voices to the highest levels of power and advocate for less fortunate women (10). She believes that the best thing a woman who is “fortunate enough to have choices about how much and when and where to work” (10) can do to combat patriarchy is to defeat the barriers in their own lives that force them down the path of the ambition gap. This chapter constructs the problem of gender inequality as a “chicken-and-egg situation” (9), where it is equally functional to dismantle societal systems first or individual internal struggles first. Sanberg’s own analysis prioritizes the individual behaviors and sets up further discussion that takes place throughout the rest of the book for how those behaviors can be enacted.
The underlying ideology present throughout all of the codes and categories I identified was the avoidance of issues having to do with intersectional oppression in feminist action in the workforce. While Sanberg acknowledges abstractly that poor women (10), and women of color (7), suffer differently under patriarchy than she and her wealthy white peers do, she does not seem to have any intention of discussing those issues in any depth. This is likely because in order to make an argument for the importance of individual success in the context of revolutionary feminist action, one must ignore two critical fallacies. First, the historical precedent of wealthy white women always holding more social power and influence than other women and yet repeatedly failing to utilize it on their behalf. Second, that Sanberg’s notion of “leaning in”, of taking power through self confidence and aggression, has regularly failed for many types of multiply oppressed women, often as a direct result of systemic barriers. Sanberg’s book, much like Friedan’s in the previous section, touches on a tangible and observable issue relating to patriarchal oppression. However, also like Friedan in the previous section, Sanberg’s failure to meaningfully engage in the varied experiences of women, and her desire to normativize the experiences of wealthy white women in particular, seems to have prevented her from examining critical aspects of the problems she attempts to resolve.
V: Film Review:
The Stepford Wives (1975)
The first category drawn from The Feminine Mystique in section IV that I was able to recognize in my analysis of the plot of this film, was the category of identity. The most obvious example of this theme occurs within the most basic premise of the film, the replacement of the wives with robotic replicas. Unlike other types of robot media, a defining characteristic of the Stepford robots is their lack of sentience, they have no identity. Further, by the end of the film, it is clear that things relating to Joanna’s identity, like Joanna’s passion for photography or her desire for extremely limited forms of gender equality, were obtrusive enough to her husband’s desires that he condemned her to death (28:36) and replaced her with a replica that lacked those signifiers of personhood. This exemplifies how patriarchy dehumanizes women to such a degree that even the smallest indicators of identity make them unappealing. This ideology also aligns with Fridan’s analysis of the problem with no name in which she describes the ultimate horror and violence of the patriarchy as the spiritual death of middle class white women who lack all fulfillment and agency.
The second category, idealized femininity, is also particularly identifiable in the film's depiction of the robotic wives. The ideal that Friedan discussed, something that is impossible to ever fulfill because of the humanity of women, is imagined in the fictional space of this film. Subtle qualities of the Stepford robots such as their enthusiastically professed passion for household tasks (51:30), their heavily sexualized and feminized appearances (1:50:21, 1:20:28), and their submissive and cheerful dispositions (1:05:25), all fall perfectly into Friedan’s understandings of the ideal. Similarly to Friedan’s housewives, the robots' proximity to the ideal makes them into machines that exist only for the enjoyment of others. Like real housewives, they are perfect and pleasant on the outside but are ultimately just empty husks on the inside.
The third category, addiction and illness, is also highly present throughout this film. For example, early on in the film, a robot who malfunctions is forced to apologize to Joanna and Bobbi for her “drunkenness and addiction” (42:04). This moment points to how any failings to meet the ideal of womanhood are attributed to womanly weaknesses while the fundamental issues, in this case the woman being a robot, is left unaddressed. This blatantly mirrors Friedan’s own understanding of societal responses to the crisis of housewives who were blamed for their own unhappiness in order to avoid examination of systemic patriarchal violence. Joanna’s own plotline is also full of thematic references to madness. Throughout her attempts to uncover the truth and most often in her interactions with her husband (1:25:41), Joanna is made to feel that her reactions to life in Stepford are ungrateful and indicative of the weakness of women's emotions generally or of her own weakness in particular. Just like with the malfunctioning robot, Joanna’s struggles with her sanity reflect the ways in which patriarchal society utilizes the failings of its own systems as further evidence for its ideologies.
Beyond the applicability of the categories, the original Stepford Wives film also parallels The Feminine Mystique in its centering of the white middle class white woman to its own detriment. This film is almost entirely devoid of any women that are not at the very pinnacle of privilege under patriarchal society. As a result, the audience must question why the creator chose to tell a story about the systematic dehumanization and enslavement of women from the perspective of fictional wealthy white housewives instead of those women who have experienced similar dehumanization and enslavement in real life. The film attempts to utilize the extreme violence and dehumanization of the plot as a metaphor for the more subtle psychological oppressions of privileged women and in the process, unintentionally touches on themes that have wildly different implications for various marginalized women. Ultimately, much like with The Feminine Mystique, the way the film sets wealthy white women as the unquestioned norm implies some degree of implicit racism and classism as well as an attempt to avoid the complexities required of a more complete and productive analysis.
The Stepford Wives (2004)
The category of professional ambition, which I identified in the section IV examination of Lean In by Sheryl Sanberg, is present throughout the entirety of this film. It begins with Joanna’s immediate character shift from being an artistic feminist housewife in the original, to a neurotic workaholic executive in the remake (8:27). Furthermore, the remake changes the plot of the original movie to ensure that all the women characters, who before had been average women, became remarkably successful career women who only became housewives after moving to Stepford (53:49). This change between the films mirrors and exaggerates Sanberg’s theory of the ambition gap. For Sanberg, the professional ambition gap is caused by the influence of societal pressures on women to have families and children. In the remake, the subtle influences of society are represented by direct physical violations of women's bodies by their husbands who force them away from the workplace into societally acceptable roles by controlling them with microchips (1:02:24).
The second category, internal barriers to success, is also present in my analysis of the remake film. Internal barriers to success seem to be represented by Joanna’s own struggle throughout the film to resist her natural inclinations for professional success in order to preserve her family. Joanna’s husband, who could perhaps represent the patriarchal systems of society, constantly pressures Joanna and argues that if she cannot perform classic feminine behaviors (i.e. be a housewife) then she will not have access to the happiness that their nuclear family offers (29:04). Joanna’s self doubt and acquiescence to outside demands through the performance of stereotypically feminine behaviors eventually lead her to a state in which she is almost completely deprived of her autonomy. This series of events mimics Sanbergs theory in that it implies that allowing the fear and self doubt taught by the patriarchy to limit behavior can prevent women from achieving success. The completion of Joanna’s arc also ultimately proves this theory as well because only when Joanna “leans into” her professional skills, intelligence, and aggression is she able to escape Stepford, save the other women (1:16:21), and profit off of her experiences (1:22:39) to achieve professional success.
The final category, individualism, is featured very heavily in this film as well, particularly in the culmination of Joanna’s character arc in which she becomes the savior of Stepford. Joanna’s personal circumstances and her initiative in the face of those circumstances, are what ultimately end the enslavement of the entire woman population of the town. The film shows the audience a sea of helpless, subservient women who have lived as robot servants for years before Joanna arrived, and then shows how they are saved because one woman had the ability to fight back for them. This kind of highly individual heroism exemplifies Sanberg’s argument that women’s liberation takes place through the actions of the individual, her belief that one person’s actions can make great change. Joanna’s actions, saving the wives from constant oppression and control, blatantly represents the film’s desire to reflect a similar ideological belief, or a similar faith in individual competent white women to transform women's liberation through the mechanism of their own self interest.
VI: Conclusions
The correspondences noted in the above section between the ideologies of the sources and their corresponding films indicate the ways in which the Stepford Wives films draw their ideological frameworks from the popular white feminisms of the eras in which they were created. Further, the analysis highlights the differences between the two eras/sources/films in its discussions of housewives versus working women, personal fulfillment versus professional success, etc. In this section I will be detailing the similarities between the eras/sources/films by utilizing my analyses of popular white feminism throughout sections IV and V. I will also expand upon my previous points and argue that throughout time, popular white feminism retains its core reliance on the homogenization of womanhood and rejection of politics that do not center wealthy white women as the pinnacle of simultaneous victimization and strength.
The qualities of popular white feminism that I touched on in my discussions of second wave feminism, through both the film and secondary source, were centered primarily around the hyper-victimization of the housewife. Friedan and the creators of The Stepford Wives film articulated the figure of the housewife as helplessness, that no matter how hard she worked to achieve functionality within the confines of patriarchy, she would always be oppressed. Although the film and secondary source representing third wave ideologies articulate more outwardly positive perspectives, focusing on women saving the world, there is still that same shared quality of helplessness buried within those narratives as well. In Lean In, Sanberg argues for privileged women to work within corporate America to fix the world on others behalf, and in doing so, she inherently submits her ideology to the indomitability of patriarchy. That argument, while based on the strength and competence of white women, also implies that they are simply not strong enough to fight for a world in which all women could be given opportunities to access power and autonomy.
Under this framework, the housewife is strong for doing constant unpaid labor and organizing the lives of her husband and children, but she is also helpless to combat the systems that cause the extreme privilege that create her purposelessness. The working woman is also strong because she is smarter and better than men and because she must work harder to succeed, but she is also weak in the face of the patriarchy that prevents her from ever combatting the systems she struggles within. These axes of strength and helplessness are performances that white womanhood bounces between as a mechanism to avoid accountability on multiple levels. Heavily dramatized depictions of white women as victims of violent patriarchy, such as the two Stepford Wives films, are articulations of this performance, ways of imagining a level of victimization that camouflages the power they possess. This is furthered by how films like The Stepford Wives and sources like Lean In and The Feminine Mystique attempt to discuss issues within the framework of universal women's liberation. In this conception, women are all on the same team and therefore, there is no need to question how white women may be benefiting from the victimization of their so-called sisters. Ultimately, these ideologies are equally present in both films, both sources, and both eras, revealing that despite progress narratives that point to increases in diversity, intersectionality, and other buzzwords, popular white feminism will always be characterized by its fundamental prioritization of white women over all else.
Works Cited
The Stepford Wives. Directed by Bryan Forbes, performances by Katherine Ross, Paula Prentiss, and Peter Masterson, Columbia Pictures, Embassy Pictures, 1975.
The Stepford Wives. Directed by Frank Oz, performances by Nicole Kidman, Bette Midler, and Glenn Close, Deline Pictures, 2004.
Friedan, Betty. “The Feminine Mystique”. New York :Norton, 1963.
Sandberg, Sheryl. Lean in: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead. First edition. Alfred A. Knopf, 2013.
Banet-Weiser, Sarah. Empowered : Popular Feminism and Popular Misogyny . Duke University Press, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1515/9781478002772.
Coontz, Stephanie. A Strange Stirring the Feminine Mystique and American Women at the Dawn of the 1960s . Basic Books, 2010.
hooks, bell. “Dig Deep: Beyond Lean In”. the feminist wire. October 28, 2013. https://thefeministwire.com/2013/10/17973/.
Garner, Bianca. “A Stepford Wives Tale: Looking back at the reaction to The Stepford Wives”. filmotomy. July 9, 2018. https://filmotomy.com/a-stepford-wives-tale-looking-back-at-the-reaction-to-the-stepford-wives/.
Palmer, Gianna. “What impact has Lean In had on women?”. Business Reporter, BBC News, New York. March 5, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/business-31727796.
“50 Top-Grossing Movies, 2004”. History.com. https://web.archive.org/web/20090304010558/.
“The Stepford Wives.” Box Office Mojo, Imbd Pro. https://www.boxofficemojo.com/release/rl3782444545/
Williams, Zoe. “Lean In: Women, Work, and the Will to Lead by Sheryl Sanberg: Review”. The Guardian. 13 March, 2013. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2013/mar/13/lean-in-sheryl-sandberg-review
Faludi, Sarah. “Facebook Feminism, Like it or Not”. no 23, The Baffler. August 2013. https://thebaffler.com/salvos/facebook-feminism-like-it-or-not
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This essay is being edited and will be returned to the site promptly.
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This essay is being edited and will be returned to the site promptly.
Philosophy
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Baruch Spinoza was born in Amsterdam, the Netherlands in 1632 to a Sephardic Jewish family (Nadler 2018, 51). In 1656, when Spinoza was 24 years old, he was expelled from his community after the religious authorities issued a writ of cherem, or banishment, in response to Spinoza’s controversial political actions as well as his unorthodox philosophies (Nadler 2018, 135-182). Immediately following his death in 1677, his works were banned by both the States of Holland and the Catholic Church, both of whom regarded his philosophy as blasphemous (Nadler 2018, 374). Among those works banned was one of Spinoza’s most famous pieces, published posthumously a year after his death, entitled “The Ethics”, which deals with a variety of topics including the nature of God, humanity, nature, and reality.
In Billom, France nearly 300 years later in 1897, Georges Bataille was born to an a-religious family, the son of a tax collector (Surya 2002, 6). In 1914 when Bataille was 17 years old, he converted to Catholicism and practiced devoutly for nine years (Surya 2002, 16-19). During this time he briefly considered joining the seminary, but ultimately rejected doing so in order to financially provide for his mother (Surya 2002, 24). By 1920, Bataille had rejected Christianity altogether and began down the path of academia, archival work, and philosophy. Bataille’s works, which encompassed both fiction novels and works of non-fiction philosophy and literary analysis, were not well regarded during his lifetime and he was often forced to publish under a pseudonym (Surya 2002, 89). However, following his death, his works became foundational to a variety of later continental philosophers such as Focault and Baudrillard. One such work is titled “Erotism: Death and Sensuality” which deals with the topics of divinity, death, sexuality, and transgression.
Although these philosophers were born nearly three centuries apart in different countries, came from vastly different religious/cultural backgrounds, and participated in distinct philosophical traditions, there are a variety of marked parallels between their works. For example, both philosophers were heavily influenced by their respective religions, drawing on themes of divinity and considerations of God in their writing. In that vein, both philosophers also held complex and nuanced relationships to religion and have been interpreted as both atheist and heavily religious or spiritual simultaneously. This apparent contradiction, as well as both philosophers' participation in theorizing that was considered transgressive and potentially immoral led both to be initially regarded as polarizing or even dangerous by some readers.
Another example of similarity between the two philosophers is their shared occupation with the human ability to participate in a complex kind of unity or understanding that is aligned with the divine. While this idea is varied in conception and execution between the two thinkers, there are a variety of, if not similarities, at least parallels between how they construct the general concept metaphysically. Furthermore, both Spinoza and Bataille’s conceptions link the experience of joy or pleasure respectively to one’s ability to reach this heightened state of knowledge/awareness. In this paper I will compare Spinoza’s theory of joy and Blessedness in “The Ethics'' to Bataille’s conception of pleasure and continuity in “Erotism: Death and Sensuality”. I will argue that although both philosophers place joy/pleasure as a high good in proximity to the divine, what each philosopher considers to be good or evil and the specific material mechanisms that they envision as leading to their “high good” are fundamentally in opposition.
Exposition: Spinoza’s Ethics
Joy and Blessedness
In book three of the Ethics Spinoza defines affect as “affections of the body by which the body’s power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections.” He explains that if a person is the adequate cause of their own affect, then that affect is an action, if not, then the affect is a passion (Spinoza 1677, EIIID3). Joy, is one of the passions, and is defined as “that passion by which the mind passes to a greater perfection”. Spinoza essentially argues that joy, and its secondary off-shoots, such as pleasure, which is the consequence of an inadequate affect where only one part of the body is affected, or cheerfulness, which is the consequence of all parts being equally affected (Spinoza 1677, E3P11S1), create a greater perfection in an individual by increasing that individual’s power of activity. In other words, a person that experiences joy, pleasure, cheerfulness, etc, to varying degrees of permanency relating to the completeness of the affect (Spinoza 1677, EIIIP56), becomes more powerful, which in this case refers to their increased ability to act according to their conatus.
To Spinoza, the increase in power of activity created by joy is what makes joy “directly good” (Spinoza 1677, EIVP41). Good here is defined not by traditional moralistic evaluations, but rather as any action that leads to an increase in power and understanding (Spinoza 1677, EIVP27) through the acquisition of reason or knowledge of the second kind (Spinoza 1677, EIVP26). Therefore, in Spinoza’s understanding, joy leads to an increase in power of activity and an increase in reason or understanding which is considered by Spinoza to be good or virtuous. Furthermore, Spinoza points to a clear and distinct knowledge and understanding of oneself and one’s affects in particular as a kind of knowledge acquisition that is “accompanied by an idea of God” (Spinoza 1677, EVP15) which Spinoza positions as a source of great joy as well as the greatest good or virtue possible (Spinoza 1677, EIVP28).
This idea of God is what Spinoza calls the third kind of knowledge, also called Blessedness. According to Spinoza, “[t]he third kind of knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things, and the more we understand things in this way, the more we understand God” (Spinoza 1677, EVP25). Blessedness as a concept is also related to a participation in the eternal, which is the closest a human can get to immortality in Spinoza’s system. When one is able to access knowledge of the third kind, one takes part in an aspect of God that is undying, so even when one’s mind and body die, the part of oneself that was the understanding of the third kind of knowledge lives on. This kind of knowledge creates the greatest kind of joy because it represents the achievement of the “greatest human perfection” (Spinoza 1677, EVP27) in its ultimate satisfaction of the striving for at least some degree of eternal continuity. Spinoza believes that understanding of the third kind of knowledge generates an ultimate kind of pleasure which we know to be pleasure caused by God, this is what Spinoza calls an “intellectual love of God” which is eternal (Spinoza 1677, EVP32-33).
Joy versus Sadness and Life versus Death
Mirroring the above discussion of joy in Spinoza’s ethics is his depiction of sadness whose function is described as the complete opposite of joy. In book four of “The Ethics” Spinoza says “[j]oy is not directly evil, but good; sadness on the other hand, is directly evil” (Spinoza 1677, EIVP41). He further explains that because sadness is an affect by which the body’s power of acting is diminished or restrained, it is made evil (Spinoza 1677, EIVP30). Furthermore, Spinoza asserts that those things that diminish our power of activity, evil things, are completely contrary to us. There is nothing shared between a person and the idea or action that could harm them. Spinoza says, “[n]o thing can be evil through what it has in common with our nature; but insofar as it is evil for us, it is contrary to us” (Spinoza 1677, EIVP30). However, it is also important to note that Spinoza also says that “[w]e know nothing to be certainly good or evil, except what really leads to understanding or what can prevent us from understanding” (Spinoza 1677, EIVP27). In this sense, Spinoza seems to argue that what is evil is what decreases our power of activity, is dissimilar to us, and decreases our understanding. However, this also provides some degree of potential for contradiction because it forces us to consider if something could theoretically exist that decreases our power while also increasing our understanding or vice versa.
It is by this overall chain of reasoning regarding sadness and power that Spinoza also comes to his understanding of death as it relates to human existence. Spinoza says, “No one, therefore, unless he is defeated by causes external, and contrary, to his nature, neglects to seek his own advantage, or to preserve his being” (Spinoza 1677, EIVP20S1). He goes on to explain that it is in the essence of man to strive to exist as they are indefinitely. According to him, no one seeks to die unless they are acted on by external forces. In this way, death to Spinoza is parallel to sadness and ultimately to evilness; death is the ultimate barrier to the striving of a person to exist. Spinoza contends with death by saying that, “a free man thinks of nothing less than of death, and his wisdom is a meditation on life, not on death”. Here, despite death being an ultimate evil for man, Spinoza argues that a free and virtuous man’s life is defined not by fear of evil or of death, but by desiring good and seeking to preserve himself and his own advantage. The virtue and freedom of this man is, in fact, in avoiding and overcoming dangers (Spinoza 1677, EIVP69), thus defining his virtue and freedom by his desire for life and avoidance of death.
Exposition: Bataille’s Erotism
Erioicism and Continuity With All Being
In chapter VIII “From Religious Sacrifice to Eroticism”, in Bataille’s “Erotism: Death and Sensuality, Bataille discusses the parallels between the eroticism of sacrificial killing and sex. Bataille understands sacrifice as “a deliberate act whose purpose is the sudden change in the victim” (Bataille 1957, 90). More specifically, he considers the act of slaughter to be a mechanism through which the animal is “brought back by death into continuity with all being to the absence of separate individualities.” The violence of sacrifice makes the victim sacred and limitless in its removal from individuality. Bataille compares this act to the act of penetration saying, “[t]he lover strips the beloved of her identity no less than the blood-stained priest his human or animal victim. The woman in the hands of her assailant is despoiled of her being” (Bataille 1957, 90). In this way, Bataille asserts that in the cases of both sacrifice and sexual eroticism, the violence of the act itself is utilized as a way to tear the “victim” from the confines of separateness and elevate them to a more divine connection with the universe, what he calls the “way into the infinite” (Bataille 1957, 91).
In this way, eroticism is understood by Bataille to be somewhat synonymous with violence and with a breaking from our individuality as it is or as we imagine it. Contexts in which this break is possible, such as during sacrifices, sex, war, prostitution, hunting, or murder, are what Bataille terms “moments of excess”. He considers the pleasure and violence of these moments of excess to be central to our “elemental nature” (Bataille 1957, 168) which if ignored, represent a failure to understand and respect our true selves, which he argues is akin to violence against the self (Bataille 1957, 173).
Pleasure and Destruction
Bataille classifies these experiences as “moments of excess”, in part because of how he conceptualizes pleasure throughout “Erotism: Death and Sensuality”. To Bataille, pleasure and eroticism are always interconnected with death and the loss of self. Therefore, he positions his definition of pleasure in opposition to those forces which he considers to be uplifting of life and the construction of self, such as reason, productivity, and the cultivation of energy. He says, “[r]eason is bound up with work and the purposeful activity that incarnates its laws. But pleasure mocks at toil, and toil we have seen to be unfavorable to the pursuit of intense pleasure.” (Bataille 1957, 168) He further explains that even when pleasure serves a use, it is always ultimately “extravagant” and more often than not has no end product beyond itself. Therefore, pleasure as an end is desired because of its extravagance (Bataille 1957, 168).
More than just extravagance, Bataille discusses pleasure as “ruinous waste” standing in contrast to the dictate of reason which encourages the increase of our possessions and knowledge. Pleasure instead encourages that we “squander considerable resources to no real purpose” (Bataille 1957, 170). Bataille compares eroticism to a wound left bleeding inside the body; it is the assuredness a person feels of the damage it will cause if left alone that demonstrates a rejection of the frantic and constant need to preserve the self inherent to everyday life. Thus the experience of eroticism, in the same way, is made pleasurable by the acceptance of the destruction it causes and the ways in which it restructures our experience of reality away from the pervasive individuality of productive activity which everyday life typically necessitates. This is why Bataille ultimately says that “[t]he truth of eroticism is treason” (Bataille 1957, 170-171).
Divinity, Eternity, and Moral Relativism: Unity in Spinoza and Bataille’s Conceptions
Divinity
Drawing from the information laid out in the above sections, there appear to be a variety of similarities between the philosophies layed out in Spinoza’s “The Ethics” and Batailles “Erotism: Death and Sensuality”. Most blatant among these similarities would be the depiction of a higher state of being. For Spinoza, this would be the concept of Blessedness which refers to an ultimate state of understanding in connection to knowledge of God. For Bataille, it would be the idea of divine continuity wherein a being is brought back into the oneness of the universe. In both philosophers’ books, this concept is held up as the highest good and greatest ideal; to reach this level of either Blessedness or continuity is an indicator of the fulfillment of the greatest human achievement. This is exemplified in the way this concept is tied into each philosophers’ concept of divinity. While Spinoza is more clear on this subject, stating that Blessedness is specifically knowledge of God which is the highest good, Bataille also associates the ecstatic nature of continuity with the accessing of the divine, which he references as something greater that exists beyond individual human understanding.
The shared connection of Blessedness and continuity to the divine by both Spinoza and Bataille is furthered by each philosophers’ positions on joy or pleasure as a method through which their proposed higher level of existence or divinity is accessed. While joy and pleasure are distinct concepts in Spinoza, with pleasure being an incomplete bodily derivative of joy (Spinoza 1677, EIIIP59), the concept of joy in Spinoza and pleasure in Bataille still share many similarities. Joy in Spinoza, constructed as an affect which increases one’s perfection and power, is understood as one of only three possible primary affects which are joy, sadness, and desire (EIIIP56). Joy appears to be a fundamental building block of the human emotive and active experience, the root of the “positive” affects like love, hope, gladness, or devotion (Spinoza 1677, EIIIP59DVI, XII, X, XVI). Without a clear and distinct knowledge of joy, there is a lack of an understanding of the self, and as a result of that, an inability to understand the self as an individual mode within the universe, and the completeness of God (Spinoza 1677, EVP15). Pleasure to Bataille is also similarly fundamental to the human essence and participation in the universe. To not act on those things that cause us pleasure represents to Bataille an ultimate evil, the definition of cruelty, because it is a denial of the true self (Bataille 1957, 173). Furthermore, without pleasure and the pursuit of pleasure in the extreme context of violent eroticism, there is, for Bataille, no possibility to explore “the truth of life” which is ultimately only revealed when we participate in, or experience, death, and come to understand “the unknown” (Bataille 1957, 91). Seeking this truth is how Bataille imagines humans as being able to participate in true communication with the infinite “continuity of all being” (Bataille 1957, 90). Both Spinoza and Bataille’s conceptions of a higher level of experience therefore seem to be wholly dependent on the participation in, or cultivation of, a positive affect of joy and pleasure respectively. But more specifically, both Blessedness and continuity represent a state of being that is brought on by a version of that positive affect that is inherent to each philosopher’s conception of human essence.
Eternity
The concept of infinity and eternity themselves are also a shared element to Spinoza and Bataille’s theorizing. It is clearly described in Spinoza’s depiction of God as “substance, which necessarily exists, that is, to whose nature it pertains to exist, or (what is the same) from whose definition it follows that he exists; and therefore, he is eternal” (Spinoza 1677, EIP19), that Spinoza understands the essence of divine substance and all of its attributes to be eternal. The knowledge of God that can be attained by humans as the third kind of knowledge, as it is discussed above, is also eternal (Spinoza 1677, EVP31). Furthermore, according to Spinoza, included in the third kind of knowledge is the knowledge of a person's mind and body under the species of eternity, meaning knowledge of the person as a finite component in God (Spinoza 1677, EVP30) instead of just a distinct finite individual (Spinoza 1677, EVP29). Spinoza essentially describes the potential of humans, by acquiring knowledge and understanding, to know something and therefore participate in something (God) that exists outside of their own temporally limited existence. Bataille’s conception of continuity functions similarly. In Bataille, the individual can be removed from their “separate individualities” (Bataille 1957, 90) through violently erotic acts in order to participate in the eternal continuity. This continuity is described as a unity between life and death and is defined by an element of harmony that is “a way into the infinite” (Bataille 1957, 91). Both philosophers seem to understand participation in the eternal to be dependent on a separation from individual conceptions of self which is then replaced with an openness to being a component of a larger and ultimately amorphous whole. The nature of Blessedness and continuity are thus wrapped up in the idea of being removed from traditional existence and time, becoming one, not just in the sense of uniting with other material or spiritual aspects of the universe, but also in uniting with the all of time and becoming eternal.
Moral Relativism
Another prominent similarity between Spinoza and Batailles’ Philosophies in “The Ethics” and “Erotism: Death and Sensuality” is the way in which they upset traditional universalizing binaries of right and wrong. In Spinoza, right and wrong are defined not by a pre-established set of moral laws, but instead by the degree to which any action increases or decreases a person's power of activity. Spinoza says, “insofar as we perceive that a thing affects us with joy or sadness, we call it good or evil” (Spinoza 1677, EIVP8D1). In its application to the treatment of others outside of the striving of the self, this moral framework holds that the pursuit of goodness for the self begets a goodness common to all (Spinoza 1677, EIVP36D1). For Spinoza, the pursuit of true virtue that is rooted in a commitment to personal conatus always ultimately is prosocial behavior.
For Bataille, morality is similarly influenced by a pursuit of the fulfillment of individual need. Bataille references the extreme ideology of Marquis de Sade, whose moral system was predicated on the idea that “the greatest suffering of others always counts for less than my [De sade’s] own pleasure” (Bataille 1957, 168). Although Bataille critics De sade’s perspective as failing to “take into account the actual make-up of every real man, inconceivable if shorn of the links made by others with him and by him with others” (Bataille 1957, 168), he still ultimately finds value in the emphasis De sade places on pleasure to the denial of all logic and reality. Bataille’s philosophical morality seems to exist in the nebulous place in between a rejection of the needs of others for the purpose of one's own pleasure and an understanding that pleasure and eroticism can only really exist in communal relation with other people. Therefore, his morality is understood as being made up of three components: placing a high value on the pursuit of pleasure, allowing for “moments of excess” in which reason is rejected and personal pleasure is prioritized, and still retaining an understanding that the realities of pleasure include a communal effort and result in a general unity with the universe.
While Spinoza and Bataille’s moralities here seem quite distinct, especially in terms of how Spinoza’s view that the pursuit of goodness for one person helps to create goodness for others contrasts to Bataille’s view that goodness for one person can, when taken to its extreme, stand in opposition to goodness for others, the similarities between the two perspectives are still numerous. Beyond the simple fact of both philosophers’ work detailing a morality that is specific to each person, there is also a shared understanding that the reality of the world is found in the interdependence of man. Both Spinoza and Bataille in their consideration of how their moral systems function, are forced to look beyond their original construction of good and evil as what is beneficial to the individual and conclude that because individuals are inherently connected, what is good and evil must be impacted by the relations between all men.
Death and Distinctions between Good Pleasure and Evil Pain: Divergence in Spinoza and Bataille’s Conceptions
Death and Waste
The primary difference between the two philosophies as I have interpreted them is located in each respective philosopher’s treatment of the concept of death. From Spinoza’s understanding of the contatus and what he holds as the highest good being directly connected to the continuation of a being as it already exists, the concept of death seems to be fundamentally incompatible with Spinoza’s ideal. While he is clear to emphasize the importance of accepting death as an inevitability (Spinoza 1677, EIVP67), he also emphasizes the virtue inherent in avoiding it as much as possible (Spinoza 1677, EIVP69). If the ultimate good for Spinoza is whatever increases one’s power of activity and allows one to continue to exist as they are, then death, as the ultimate dissipation of one’s existence, would be the greatest evil. This position is diametrically opposed to Bataille’s understanding of death as an ideal. A state in which one reaches an ecstatic unity with the universe (Bataille 1957, 91).
I have struggled throughout my work on this topic to find a way to reconcile Bataille’s understanding of death as a complete good and ultimate goal, with Spinoza’s perspective and I have been unsuccessful. It is my opinion that should Bataille and Spinoza have had the opportunity to meet and discuss their respective metaphysics, that this would be a primary point of unresolvable contention.
Good, Evil, and Opposites
The other primary location of disagreement would likely occur in relation to the various contrasting dichotomies where the philosophers oppose each other on which is good and which is evil, such as pain/pleasure and increased power of activity/destruction of utility. I imagine that because Spinoza says that anything that leads to a greater level of understanding is ultimately good (Spinoza 1677, EVP27), that if Bataille could convince Spinoza that pain, and waste (not death because it is so opposed to Spinoza’s primary understandings of human essence) lead to a higher order of understanding, that Spinoza would theoretically agree that these things are good in certain contexts. However, Spinoza would only be able to come to this conclusion through an understanding of these examples of waste and violence as being ultimately productive and logical in some way, that through their ability to increase one’s understanding, they increase one’s power of acting as well. This conclusion would again result in a fundamental incompatibility between the philosophers, as the entire point of Bataille uplifting of waste and pain is in the service of generating pleasure through the complete rejection of increasing one’s power of acting. It is the literal point of waste, pain, and violence for Bataille to reject utility and it is also the way in which these actions allow us to reach the higher level of understanding that Bataille discusses.
Conclusion
Throughout this paper, as I have presented the arguments of both Spinoza and Bataille and highlighted a variety of points of comparison between the two philosophers, I have revealed that, while they share a remarkable number of corresponding ideas, their philosophies ultimately result in what appear to be fundamentally opposite conclusions. However, the process of comparison has revealed critical information about which components of each philosopher’s system’s are flexible and which are fundamental to the cohesion of their arguments. For example, the higher level understanding that each philosopher describes, what they call Blessedness and continuity, which I have discussed at great length throughout this paper, share a variety of minor differences yet seem to be essentially similar. In the process of comparison, it has become apparent that both Blessedness and continuity are subjects for which Spinoza and Bataille lack an overabundance of specific description or rules. It is this lack of specificity that allows for their compatibility as concepts, which in turn allows us to understand that while the central themes and ideas of Blessedness and continuity are critical to the integrity of the rest of each philosopher’s arguments, the particulars of these constructions are more flexible. These are places where readers can use a more subjective and interpretive lens to construct meaning for themselves.
In contrast, other components of Spinoza and Bataille’s works have been revealed throughout the process of comparison to be integral key-stone elements of each philosopher’s arguments. The contrasting emphases on death and life for example, represent a disagreement where no reasoning that I have thought to consider has been able to mitigate the contradicting viewpoints between the philosophers. This result has revealed to me the centrality and uncompromisable importance of life in Spinoza’s ethical evaluations and death in Bataille’s. Without Spinoza’s prioritization of life, his ideas about God, human essence, and goodness itself cannot hold. Similarly in Bataille, without a desire for death, pleasure and violence alone hold no meaning. Without these points, the entirety of each argument risks collapse. Ultimately, this analysis reveals that while there are key elements of Spinoza and Bataille’s philosophies that are essentially incompatible, the process of comparing both their similarities and incompatibilities allows us to consider each philosopher in a variety of new and unique ways which a study of each respective philosopher alone could not produce.
In the future, if I am given the opportunity to continue this research for a longer period of time and with a less restrictive page limit, I would want to apply these new and valuable understandings of each philosopher’s work to a new form of comparison. In particular, I would like to consider how I could apply the more integral or inflexible components of “The Ethics” and “Erotism: Death and Sensuality” to an exploration of how Spinoza and Bataille’s ethics and metaphysics lend themselves to different readings of economic systems. I consider the emphasis placed by both philosophers on the opposing treatments of reason, productivity, waste, and excess to be widely applicable to contemporary debates on late stage capitalism in particular. Questions to consider could include: What can a comparison between the philosophies of Spinoza and Bataille tell us about the functionality of the rigid dichotomy between productivity and waste? or Is there a way to prioritize individual activity and power without completely foregoing senseless waste and proximity to death?
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This essay is being edited and will be returned to the site promptly.
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This essay is being edited and will be returned to the site promptly.
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This essay is being edited and will be returned to the site promptly.
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This essay is being edited and will be returned to the site promptly.
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This essay is being edited and will be returned to the site promptly.
There are a few personal projects I’m working on right now. A photography zine titled “A Guide to the Flora and Fauna of Neighborhood Alleyways”, Two poetry zine’s with original artwork (in collaboration with people who can draw more than stick figures don’t worry), and a short essay on Frankenstein and the creation of icons through adaptation. As soon as these projects are complete you will hopefully be able to find them here on the website.
Above is a sample photo from “A Guide to the Flora and Fauna of Neighborhood Alleyways”
Poetry
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i bought 3 plums for us to put in the icebox
just like that poem said
i've always wanted to taste the cold sweet thrill of selfishness for myself
but my modern machine was much too cold it seems
it's only equiped for more extreme temperatures
you told me this morning, i froze the plums straight through
and when they had defrosted on the counter
the skin was wrinkled and loose
the flesh misshapen and soft
i might eat one anyway, over your pristine kitchen sink
stain it with bright red juice
let it coat my chin and finger tips
as you watch in confused silence and this unseasonable rainstorm rips through the trees outside
this is just to say
That you know how desperate i always am to be forgiven
but those were my plums too weren’t they
and i need to see what you will do
Now that i've eaten them
dear god i can't imagine anything this excruciating could be delicious
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I give my sister the last rasberyy of summer, i pull it from its thorned bush,
drouping in the cold air and missing leaves
i yell her name from the bottom of the stairs,
and when she stumbles into the kitchen bleary and warm from sleep, i offer it up to her in the palm of my hand and worry she will not eat it, but she does
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You got up early this morning
And because we had opened the window last night before we slept
As a compromise
The air flew in
Wings and beak of cold wind circling the bed
Then burrowing and nestling under the sheets next to me
In the space you so cruelly vacated
I’m not awake yet
Still clinging to the tail ends of my dreams
Though with less fervor I think then I had tried to cling to you
As you slipped out at the rude interruption of the second
Angry scream of your alarm
In my sleep the noises of you filter in
Purposeful footsteps on creaking floorboards
Quiet but not gentle
Fabric rustling
tangled and braided with wild violets
Into a nice big scarf
That Ill wrap round your neck
So you stay warm
Running water down the hall
Overflow bubbling with your foaming face wash
It tumbles down wooden steps
The old blue paint of them peeling off beneath the tidal flood of
Sanitized water, the crust of sleep and dead skin
I can’t hear you anymore after that
Even the street outside is quiet
No birds singing but the wind
I do not wake gently
But I see you sitting there on the edge of the bed with a plate of breakfast on your lap eating carefully like you always do
sweet, with no crumbs on your lips
So unbearably beautiful in the half light
It hurts me to look at you first thing
Without time for my eyes to adjust
my love
I know that it is trite and I am oh so very tired
But still, it is true
i am cold and empty as the bed without you
please come back to sleep
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as published in Grinnell Underground Magazine
she (the girl) woke up today, hungry
as the sun rose
she (the girl) walks down to the river bed
the mud, like paint or dark fruit
stains the bottoms of her feet
and the ends of her night dress
she (the girl) pushes forward
into the stain of the red mud
covered
in the light of the sunrise
in the mud
in her dress
in the shadow of the hill and her home behind her
she (the girl) draws herself
inexorably towards the water
where the light of her sun dies each day
doused in emphatic quiet
on the banks of the river
her leg snags on a root
she (the girl) stumbles
and looks back
her dress is torn
stained red
blood and mud
combined in violent integration
she (the girl) pauses
breathes out clouds of warm air that fog her vision
and considers
she (the girl) is tearing a bit at her seams
she (the girl) stands here
on the brink
and there the river flows
when she (the girl) had woken
in the muffled light of dawn
knowing and wanting had been drowned in the uproar
water rushing turbulently between her ears
too loud for conscious thought
only forward movement had existed
but now
with the sharpness of the air
and the wound
she (the girl) does not know what to do
what to want
what she (the girl) does know
is what is in the river
she (the girl) knows that everything is in the river
knows that everything is in the river but hunger
because that is inside of her
she (the girl) limps forward
in the water
red fades to dark
color beyond blue beyond black
the stains stick as they will
then give way to movement
to immeasurable strength
too large for conscious thought
too full
she (the girl) knows that she (the river) is never hungry
but she (the girl) does not envy her
her cold cuts gently then numbs
and her legs, now unfeeling
beyond color
move with unrelenting strength
immeasurable
too cold for conscious thought
the farther out she (the girl) goes
the stronger the current feels
she (the river) has a pull in her
and she (the girl) has a pull to match
they reach up to meet each other
bending and splashing
playfully in the billowing wind
this is a place where two things meet
a crossroads
where the river disrupts the path
becomes the path
the girl into the river
an absorption
a digestion
she (the girl) trembles
in cold
in hunger
in anticipation
her hand breaks surface
a breach
a collision
this is gentle intrusion
this is violence
this is a necessary act
she (the girl and the river) reaches inside
her/self
it is wet and dark
strange, aching, familiar
her fingers grasp searchingly
they bump rib bones
they catch in the muck and the weeds
she (the river) finds what she (the girl) is looking for
and she (the girl), looking, finally takes what she (the river) finds
it is painful
and not
like warm hands on frozen lips
like the burn of a clean wound
like skin and fabric and mind tearing on the bank of a river
like the itching hole of an empty stomach
she (the girl) pulls herself back
her arm breaks the surface of the water
she (the girl) pants heavily
cool air stings against wet skin
and the water rushes around her
she (the girl) looks down
while she (the river) looks up
they stare in silence
they wait
their perspectives’ shift
in her palm there sits
a rock
the rock pulses and gushes
the rock is smooth and still
her mouth waters
saliva drips down her chin
flowing down her chest and legs
into the water
now,
again,
there is unthinking movement
too quick for conscious thought
in her palm there was a rock
now her hands are empty
now her mouth is full
she (the girlthe river) flows comfortably
uncovered
hunger sated
for now
she does not think she will go home